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MULLINS v. SIMMONS: THE EARLY VESTING RULE 
AND THE "DEATH WITHOUT ISSUE" CLAUSE 
by Lynda L. Butler 
In a recent decision, Mullins v. Simmons, the Supreme Court of Virginia clarified 
the effect of the "death without issue" clause on future interests created by a 
conveyance. 235 Va. -1 4 VLR 2141 (March 4, 1988). Simmons involved a conveyance by 
a father ("0") to his daughter ("A") "during her natural life, and at her death to her 
children, if any, and if the said ... [daughter] shall die without issue, then to the next of 
kin on her fathers side." 4 VLR at 2141. The daughter had one child ("B"), who in turn 
had a daughter ("C"). The child B predeceased the life tenant A, but C survived A. 
Prior to their deaths, the life tenant A, her child B, and B's husband ("H") 
conveyed a portion of the land acquired from A's fa ther O. The grantees of the 
conveyance later conveyed that portion to the defendants, the Simmons. After B's 
daughter C died testate, leaving her estate to her husband Mr. Mullins, he then brought 
an ejectment action against the Sim mons. Plaintiff claimed that he owned the land tha t 
had been conveyed to the Simmons because his wife C was a taker under the original 
deed from 0 - either as a child, as issue, or as next of kin. Plaintiff further argued that 
the remainder in the children of A could not vest until A's death. Thus, the conveyance 
from A, B, and H could convey only a life estate, which ended when A died. 
The court rejected plaintiff's arguments, concluding instead that B had a vested 
remainder which had not been divested and which she could convey. Defendants thus 
acquired a valid fee estate from A, B, and H. The court explained that "unless a contrary 
intent clearly appears from the instrument under consideration, the law favors early 
vesting of estates." Id. at 2142. O's conveyance thus created a life estate in A and, once 
A had a child, a vested remainder in that child subject to open. Because of the early 
vesting rule, the remainder vested as soon as a child was born to A. Id. at 2142-43. 
Further, the remainder was not divested because the life tenant A died with issue (C). 
Id. at 2143. 
In applying the early vesting rule, the court rejected plaintiff's argument that Va. 
Code § 55-13 delayed the vesting of the remainder until the death of the life tenant. 
Section 55-13 provides: "Every limitation in any deed or will contingent upon the dying 
of any person without ... issue ... shall be construed a limitation to take effect when 
such person shall die not having such ... issue .•• living at the time of his death, or born 
to him within ten months thereafter .... tt Va. Code § 55-13 (1986). The provision did 
not delay vesting of the children's remainder because, as the court explained, the 
provision applied to the contingent limitation of the estate in the next of kin, not to the 
creation of an estate in the children. 4 VLR at 2144. 
Nor was C, the grandchild of the life tenant, an original taker under O's 
conveyance. C clearly could not qualify as a child of the life tenant A under the common 
meaning of that word since C was a grandchild of A. Id. at 2143. Further, although C 
clearly was an issue of A, O's conveyance did not grant an interest to the issue. Id. at 
2143-44. Finally, C could not take as next of kin because the kin could take only if A 
died without issue, and under the facts of Simmons A had died with issue surviving her. 
The gift over to the next of kin thus failed once the condition divesting the children's 
remainder could no longer occur. Id. at 2144; see also Disney v. Wilson, 190 Va. 445, 457, 
57 S.E.2d 144 (1950). 
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Although the Virginia Supreme Court appears to have reached the correct result in 
Simmons, the court's analysis is at times vague and incomplete. The early vesting rule 
may indeed be the rule in Virginia and many other jurisdictions. But that rule is only a 
general guideline to be used in deciding whether a future interest is a contingent or 
vested remainder. In addition to considering that rule, the court also needs to examine 
the language of the conveyance to determine if there is any condition precedent to 
vesting. See generally L. Simes, Handbook of the Law of Future Interests §§ 90, 91 (2d 
ed. 1966). One possible condition precedent is an implied condition of survivorship. See 
id. §§ 90, 93. In Sim mons the court failed to address that possibility in construing th-e-
conveyance. Because of this failure, some may question the court's decision. 
The possibility of an implied survivorship condition arises in Sim mons because of 
the language creating a remainder in A's children "if any" and because of the existence of 
an alternative gift over in case the life tenant dies without issue. It is not clear whether 
the phrase "if anyll just means a child has to be born or whether it ties in the children's 
interest to the "death without issue" clause. The existence of an alternative gift over to 
the kin arguably implies a condition that the children must survive the life tenant to 
take. See T. Bergin & P. Haskell, Preface to Estates in Land and Future Interests 130 (2d 
ed. 1984). If a survivorship condition is implied, then O's conveyance would create a life 
estate in A, an alternative contingent remainder in A's children, and an alternative 
contingent remainder in O's next of kin. If the condition is not implied, then A still 
would have a life estate, while A's children would have a vested remainder in fee simple 
subject to divestment by a shifting executory interest and O's next of kin would have the 
shifting executory interest. 
The court in Simmons adopted the second classification scheme without ever 
indicating that it was choosing between two schemes by deciding against an implied 
survivorship condition. See 4 VLR at 2143. Perhaps the court did not realize that the 
survivorship issue existed or that two classification schemes were possible. But even if it 
had recognized and addressed the matter, it still could have reached the same result. 
Under Virginia law implied survivorship conditions generally are not preferred, 
apparently because of the constructional preferences for early vesting and for condition 
subsequents rather than condition precedents. See Rennolds v. Branch, 182 Va. 678, 687-
91, 29 S.E.2d 847 (1944); T. Bergin & P. Haskell, supra, at 130 & n.29. See generally L. 
Simes, supra, §§ 90-96. The court's treatment of the vesting issue thus is troubling 
because of its incomplete analysis, and not because of its result. 
Similar problems exist with the court's treatment of Va. Code § 55-13. Although 
the court's result seems correct, its analysis is awkward and difficult to understand. The 
court's description of the statute as "focus[ing] upon contingent limitations to estates" 
does little to clarify the meaning and effect of the statute. See 4 VLR at 2144. Nor is 
the court's distinction between "a contingent limitation of an estate" and "the creation of 
an estate" particularly helpful. Id. Given the complexity of future interest law, these 
problems may be understandable-:-But understandable or not, the court's opinion does 
Ii ttle to provide attorneys with meaningful rules and guidelines for analyzing future 
in terest issues. 
Section 55-13 adopts the definite failure of issue approach to interpreting the 
meaning of the clause "death without issue." When such a clause is used, two possible 
interpretations exist. One interpretation, known as the indefinite failure of issue 
approach, construes the phrase "die without issue" as meaning that, if at any time in the 
future the line of descent dies out, the gift over takes effect. See T. Bergin &. P. 
Haskell, supra, at 236. The second interpretation, the definite failure of issue approach, 
construes the phrase as referring only to the time of death of the named party (A in 
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Simmons): if that party has issue surviving him, then the gift over fails. Id. at 236-37. 
Virginia and most other American jurisdictions prefer the definite failure interpretation 
because it minimizes uncertainty about vesting and avoids problems under the Rule 
against Perpetuities. See generally L. Simes, supra, §§ 97-100. 
Section 55-13 thus establishes a rule of law for construing and classifying future 
interests involving the "death without issue" clause. Under the facts of Sim mons, the 
statute would not affect the vested remainder in A's children because the phrase "die 
without issue" is not part of the language creating the remainder. But the statute would 
apply to the contingent interest of O's next of kin. Under the statute their interest must 
vest, if at all, at the time of A's death, and not at some indefinite time in the future. 
Because issue (C) existed at the time of A's death, the gift over failed. 
In conclusion, Mullins v. Simmons appears to reach the correct result but with 
analysis that is incomplete and difficult to understand. Because of the problems with the 
court's analysis, attorneys may have difficulty accepting Simmons. Perhaps more 
importantly, they may have difficulty understanding all the issues and rules of law 
implicated by the Simmons dispute. 
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